K-SEED CASE STUDY 1
Fruit Seeds
The kiwifruit, locally known as "Tojong-darae” (토종 다래) originates from wild Darae (Actinidia) vines in China, but it was introduced to Korea in the 1980s. To differentiate from imported kiwi, Korean growers adopted the name “Tojong-darae” (“native darae”) in the early 1990s. (Source)
Initially, Korean farmers cultivated the standard ‘Hayward’ green kiwi variety imported from New Zealand, which was not under strict patent control at the time. However, as the kiwi market evolved, new proprietary varieties emerged. Notably, New Zealand’s Zespri company commercialized a golden-fleshed kiwi (variety Hort16A and its successor G3/SunGold) under strict plant breeder’s rights. Korean growers who wished to grow these premium gold kiwis had to enter contracts and pay royalties of about 15% of gross sales to Zespri. (Source)
In fact, a handful of Jeju Island farms grew Zespri’s Gold kiwi under license, paying fees, while “most Cham-darae farmers could not afford to grow gold kiwi at all” due to the restrictions and cost. This left Korean kiwi production at a disadvantage, skewed toward the less lucrative green varieties. (Source)
To break this dependency, Korean researchers bred domestic golden kiwi varieties. The Rural Development Administration (RDA) launched a kiwi breeding program in 2008 aimed at “countering foreign variety royalties”. Within a few years they released new gold kiwis such as ‘Halla Gold’, ‘Jesaeng Gold’ and ‘Haegeum’. These Korean-bred kiwis require no royalty payments, allowing farmers to plant them. (Source)
The impact has been significant: by 2020, about 57% of Korea’s gold kiwis were of the local ‘Haegeum’ variety (no royalty). The government proudly noted that replacing Zespri’s kiwi with domestic breeds could save Korean growers billions of won in fees over time.
This case illustrates how monopoly control of fruit cultivars (via plant patents/PVP) can be overcome through local breeding efforts. (Summarized study)
K-SEED CASE STUDY 2
Vegetable Seeds
In the late 20th century, South Korea had developed many of its own vegetable seed varieties through domestic seed companies. However, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 marked a turning point when struggling Korean seed firms were bought out by multinational corporations.
Late 1990s: A notable example is Hungsim (Hungnong) and Joongang Seed acquired by Seminis (Mexico), which was later acquired by Monsanto.
It was a hot pepper variety Cheongyang chili, a spicy pepper originally bred by a Korean company. During the post-crisis mergers, the company was acquired by the U.S. agribusiness Monsanto, meaning Korea had to buy back its own chili seeds from abroad. Similarly, the Sambok honey watermelon, which once supplied 30% of Korea’s watermelon market, and other indigenous varieties like “Gold-bar” melon (Geumssaragi chamoe) and Bulam cabbage fell under foreign ownership after their parent seed companies were sold. In total, around 2,000 Korean-developed crop varieties saw their ownership transfer to overseas firms in this period. Korean farmers growing these crops became dependent on purchasing seeds (or paying royalties) to the new owners, illustrating a clear case of seed monopolization. The consolidation peaked in 1998 when Mexico-based Seminis (later acquired by Monsanto) bought Korea’s #1 and #3 seed companies (Hungsim/Hungnong and Joongang Seed), giving “Monsanto Korea” control over dozens of key vegetable seeds like paprika, chili pepper, spinach, and tomato. By the early 2010s, Monsanto’s Korean arm held the sales rights for ~70 crop seed lines, effectively dominating the vegetable seed market. (Source)
2010s: Another example that has not been as negative was when Dongbu Farm Hannong (now part of LG Chem) reacquired Monsanto Korea’s seed assets.
This was a move heralded as “regaining seed sovereignty after 15 years”. (Source) This repatriation brought back a trove of genetic resources and variety rights under domestic control. Another domestic player, Nongwoo Bio, remained independent throughout and grew to become Korea’s leading vegetable seed company. Still, as of 2011 the top-five seed firms in Korea included four foreign-owned companies (the local subsidiaries of Monsanto, Syngenta, Sakata, etc.) alongside Nongwoo Bio.
(Source, table): Nongwoo Bio was the only domestic firm among the leaders, while the others were subsidiaries of foreign multinationals. This underscores the degree of foreign corporate presence in Korea’s seed industry following the late-1990s acquisitions.
K-SEED CASE STUDY 3
Staple Seeds
Staple cereal crops like rice and barley have remained largely outside of corporate monopolies in Korea. The government and public research institutes (Rural Development Administration, etc.) took the lead in breeding and distributing these seeds (Source).
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Rice seed supply is essentially self-sufficient and domestically controlled. Multiple Korean-bred rice varieties (e.g. Hyunmi, Japonica types) are freely available to farmers through national seed programs. Barley, wheat, soybeans and other “field crops” follow a similar model where the government develops varieties and farmers often save or exchange seeds among themselves for planting next season. While plant variety protection (PVP) laws still formally apply to these crops, Korea’s implementation allows small farmers to reuse seed on their own farm, especially for food grains like rice and barley, without paying royalties in most cases (Source).
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Farm-saved seed practices remain common in staple crops, which has helped prevent any single company from monopolizing rice or barley. Notably, Korea has not commercialized GM (genetically modified) rice or corn, so the kind of patent-enforced monopoly seen with GM seeds in other countries is not an issue for Korean staples.
There is a clear importance of public sector support. Rice and kimchi ingredients are considered strategic since Korea is fully self-reliant in seed for only four crops: rice, chili pepper, cabbage, and radish, which are daily food staples. In these cases, high domestic demand motivated active local breeding, ensuring farmers had local varieties to grow. For barley and other less-consumed grains, demand (and thus breeding investment) is lower (Source, Data).
This implies that without continued public breeding programs, even staple crop seeds could become vulnerable to foreign dependence. So far, Korea’s staple seed sector remains a notable exception to the seed monopoly trend, highlighting the role of government stewardship in keeping these seeds as a public good.
CASE STUDY 4
Key Players in the
Korean Seed Market
Despite the country’s small size, South Korea has over 2,100 registered seed companies. (Source) However, the industry is highly polarized with a few large companies dominating revenues while the vast majority are tiny operations.
Early 2010s: The “Big 5” seed suppliers in Korea held a major share of the domestic market. These were: Nongwoo Bio (a Korean vegetable seed firm), Monsanto Korea (U.S., now part of Bayer), Syngenta Korea (Switzerland), Koregón (a Korean-Japanese joint venture), and Sakata Korea (Japan). Nongwoo Bio, known for its vegetable hybrids (peppers, cabbages, watermelon, etc.), was the largest, with about 35% of the top-five’s combined sales. The others, all foreign-affiliated, together made up the remaining ~65% (Source) This underscores that foreign multinationals had captured a large portion of Korea’s seed market following the IMF-crisis mergers.
Present: Monsanto Korea’s seed business was acquired by LG (via FarmHannong) in 2012–2013, meaning those former #2 and #3 players are now under domestic ownership and merged into LG’s FarmHannong Seeds (Source). Nongwoo Bio remains a top player, continuing to invest heavily (20% of seed sales in R&D) to breed new vegetable varieties source. Syngenta and Sakata still operate their Korean seed divisions, focusing on vegetables and ornamentals. Japanese firms (Sakata, Takii, etc.) have a notable presence especially in vegetable seeds like radish, turnip, and floriculture crops. Meanwhile, new Korean entrants are emerging in niche areas (e.g. WithPlant Inc. in native seeds source), but their market share is small.
Overall, the seed market in Korea remains heavily dependent on foreign germplasm for non-staple crops, even when local companies distribute them. This is reflected in trade data: four foreign companies still account for a significant portion of vegetable seed sales, and Korea’s global seed market share is only about 1.4%. (Source)
MARKET OVERVIEW
In 2020, Korea’s seed market was valued around $620 million (₩8.64 trillion), which was only ~1.4% of the $44.9 billion global seed market (Source). By 2024, one analysis estimated the market at $1.6 billion (Source), though official figures remain closer to the lower end. The industry has seen steady growth (~4–6% annually) in line with global trends. However, South Korea relies heavily on imported seed or foreign-bred varieties for many crops. According to the National Seed Association, Korea is fully self-sufficient in seeds for just a handful of crops (rice and a few vegetables, as noted). For most other crops such as fruits like peppers and tomatoes, to specialty vegetables, a significant portion of seeds (or the breeding lines) originate from abroad (Source). In fact, Korea’s dependence on overseas seeds can be quantified by trade balance: over the last decade, seed imports have been more than double seed exports by value (Source).
This seed trade deficit indicates that Korean farmers and companies pay substantial royalties and import fees for foreign seeds. From 2012 to 2021, Korea’s seed import payments totaled about ₩1.65 trillion ($1.18 billion), whereas seed export earnings were only ₩698 billion ($502 million). In other words, for every $1 earned from exporting Korean seeds, about $2 were spent importing seeds (Source).
The outflow largely comprises royalties for horticultural hybrids and proprietary varieties (vegetables, fruit tree saplings, flower seeds) from multinational breeders. On the flip side, Korea’s own seed exports, roughly $50–60 million per year in recent years, have stagnated, keeping the country around 30th in the world in seed export.
The government set goals to boost seed exports to $200 million by 2022 (Source), but this target has not been met; exports remain a fraction of that, indicating competitive challenges for domestic seed breeders on the world stage.